



July 3, 1950 (Continued)

to CINCFE factual accuracy, plausibility, and objectivity in its overt output, arguing that creation of receptivity was essential as a first step to the success of later operations. (DA TT 3457) - - - - - (TAB 3)

4. 11:57 a.m. -- Ambassador Kirk reported that Soviet domestic propaganda was picturing the U.S. along as the aggressor in Korea. He urged that a special propaganda effort on our part be made to convey to the Soviet people that the principal states of the world were acting together through the UN against the North Korean aggression. (Tel. 26) - - - - - (TAB 4)

5. [12:30 p.m.] -- Mr. Menon of the Indian Delegation told Mr. Noyes and Mr. Bolte of USUN that only if the non-Communist world made connection with the Chinese Communists would it be possible to prevent the Chinese from going completely under Moscow's domination. He said the Russians, while professing the opposite, were trying to keep the Chinese Communists out of the UN and to prevent them from having any contact with the non-Soviet world. He apparently wanted to convey that India had not changed its view on the need for seating the Chinese Communists. (USUN Memo by Bolte, US/S/1274) (TAB 5)

6. 1:16 p.m. -- Ambassador Crocker reported his conclusion after a conversation with the Prime Minister of Iraq that Arab League politicians would probably follow an opportunistic course, and would prefer to pursue the dispute with Israel to giving full support to UN action in Korea. He added, however, that the Embassy had heard numerous expressions of support in political circles for the UN action, and criticism of the position taken by Egypt. (Tel. 5) - - - - - (TAB 6)